¿Puede la mente ser origen de la moral?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.37211/2789.1216.v1.n1.5Keywords:
Philosophy, Morals, Mind, EvolutionAbstract
According to some evolutive positions, man evolved towards some behaviors of cooperation, because these ones have been evolutively beneficial for survivalness. This first posture don’t have to be unattached from the empathy posture wich points that man is able to input mental states (propositionals and non-propositionals) to other people. Based on these points (empathy, compasion and cooperation as evolutive characteristics) we could hold that “moral intuition” may be derived from both postures and circumscribed in our mental programing as an species. Thus, man had to evolve to develop the capacity to input mental states to others, and as this capacity may be understood as one of the mind modules -attribution mental module -the analogous case would be happening in the case of the moral: there would be a mind module produced by phylogenetic evolution, and this by considering the two evolutionary postures mentioned above. In this way, it’s a must to examine the characteristics that are consequences of having a module of mind attribution, besides the characteristics of an eventual moral module.
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